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I. INTRODUCTION
If credit card-holders purchase items they cannot afford, they
may make minimum payments and avoid default. Most people carry
debt on their credit cards,' and card-issuers who profit from interest

1.
Approximately 35% of all card-holders pay their balances in full each month. Anne
Marriott, Charge It? Spontaneous Spending Can Be Buyers' Downfall, The Washington Times
Cl (Dec. 8, 1996). These "convenience users" are sometimes called "dead beats" or "freeloaders"
by the credit industry. Michelle Singletary and Albert B. Crenshaw, Flood of Credit Cards
Leaves Sea of Bankruptcies, Sacramento Bee F1 (Dee. 15, 1996).

1997]

COMMON LAW OFFRAUD

1259

on these balances encourage consumers to carry a balance.2 When a
debtor acquires too much debt and files for bankruptcy, the debtor
may generally discharge all of his debts to gain a "fresh start."3 This
discharge of debts completely bars creditors from collecting the money
owed to them, and the resulting losses have frustrated the credit card
4
industry.
To prevent debts from becoming uncollectible due to discharge,
credit card-issuers frequently claim "fraud," alleging that a debtor
used his credit card with the intention of filing for bankruptcy and
discharging the debt.5 Card-issuers bring such claims under section
6
523(a)(2)(A) (the "fraud exception") of the Bankruptcy Code
("Bankruptcy Code" or "Code") which excepts from discharge those
debts obtained by false pretenses, false representations, or actual
fraud.7 Upon proving that a debt is excepted from discharge, a cardissuer may collect that debt after the debtor obtains a discharge.

2.
In 1995, banks generated $35 billion in interest from debt carried on credit cards.
Laurie Hays, Credit Cards: Banks'MarketingBlitz Yields Rash of Defaults, Wall St. J. B1 (Sept.
25, 1996). See Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults and Credit Card Profits, 70th Annual
Meeting of the Natl. Conference of Bankr. Judges, 8-5, 8-11 to 8-13 (Oct. 1996) (observing the
overall profitability of the credit card industry compared to the banking system).
3.
See generally 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1994). When enacting the Bankruptcy Code, Congress
recognized that the discharge was "perhaps the most important element of the fresh start for a
consumer." H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 128 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CAN.
5963, 6089. See also Elizabeth Gavit Filipow, Note, CreditorAcquiescence as a Defense to an
Exception to Dischargein Bankruptcy, 58 Ind. L. J. 319, 329-331 (1982) (describing the "fresh
start" policy in the Bankruptcy Act). For a general analysis of the discharge policy see Margaret
Howard, A Theory of Dischargein ConsumerBankruptcy, 48 Ohio St. L. J. 1047 (1987).
4.
See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1994) (detailing effects of a discharge). In 1995, bank card losses
from personal bankruptcies amounted to $4.7 billion, an increase of 45% from the previous year.
These losses are expected to reach $9 billion in 1997. Ford Elsaesser, Testimony Before House
Committee on Banking and FinancialServices on Consumer Debt, Delinquencies, and Personal
Bankruptcy, 1996 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. LEXIS 80, *3 (Oct.). Overall credit card losses due to
bankruptcy exceeded $10.4 billion. Delinquency on Consumer Loans: Hearing of the House
Banking and Financial Services Committee, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Sept. 12, 1996) (available in
LEXIS Federal News Service) (testimony of Rep. LaFalce). This figure presumably includes
credit card losses suffered by non-banks such as AT&T and other private companies. See George
Ritzer, Expressing America 34-41 (Pine Forge, 1995) (distinguishing between bank and non-bank
credit cards). This note will not distinguish these entities but will refer to them generally as
"card-issuers."
5.
See In re Sziel, 206 B.R. 490, 490 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997) ('CThis is a routine adversary
proceeding alleging that the Debtor committed fraud in the use of a credit card" (emphasis
added)); In re Alvi, 191 B.R. 724, 726 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (noting routine filing of
§ 523(a)(2)(A) complaints by credit card-issuers); In re Parkhurst, 202 B.R. 816, 820 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting nationwide "influx" of § 523(a)(2)(A) complaints by credit card-issuers).
6.
11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1994).
7.
Id. § 523. Section 523 provides: "(a) A discharge under section 727... of this title does
not discharge an individual debtor from any debt ... (2) for money, property, services, or an ex-
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Historically, courts have struggled when determining whether
a credit card-holder committed fraud under section 523(a)(2)(A). To
overcome conceptual dilemmas, courts have created different theories
for analyzing credit card debt under the fraud exception.8 Some courts
have recently discarded these credit card theories and have applied
the common law of fraud to determine the dischargeability of credit
card debt.9 The common law of fraud primarily differs from the credit
card theories in that the common law requires the credit card-issuer to
prove a debtor's subjective intent to defraud and to show the creditor's
own "justifiable reliance."1
Commentators have questioned the propriety of using the
common law standard to evaluate modern credit card transactions."
Additionally, the common law standard conflicts with a recent proposal to Congress by the consumer credit industry advocating an
expansion of section 523(a)(2)(A) to except from discharge any debt
incurred without a reasonable expectation of repayment. 12 This
proposal, precipitated by a record number of personal bankruptcies in
1996,13 is merely a means for consumer creditors to recover losses from
bankruptcy without changing their lending practices. 14 It results from

tension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by-(A) false pretenses, a false
representation, or actual fraud... ." Id.
8.
See notes 33-44 and accompanying text.
9.
See, for example, In re Briese, 196 B.R. 440, 449 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1996) (describing
how the common law of fraud "neatly solves the struggle over conceptualizing credit card fraud").
See generally Lisa K. Gorman, Rethinking Credit Card Fraud and § 523(a)(2)(A), Norton Bankr.
Law Advisor (Feb. 1997) (describing recent cases applying the common law of fraud).
10. In re Briese, 196 B.R. at 450-452. See Part II.D (discussing application of the common
law of fraud to credit card cases).
11. See, for example, Martha Middleton and James J. Daly, An UnreliableProposition?,9
Credit Card Mgt. 106-108 (June 1996) (describing the credit industry's discord with the
justifiable reliance standard of the common law fraud); Is Reliance Becoming THE Issue in Credit
Card DischargeabilityActions?, 4 Consumer Bankr. News (Mar. 10, 1996) (discussing whether
"courts are asking creditors to show unreasonable reliance").
12. Economics. The Curtain Rises on the Latest Bankruptcy Drama, Credit Card News
(Dec. 15, 1996).
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission, established in 1994, is
investigating proposed changes to the Bankruptcy Code and is due to report to Congress, the
Supreme Court, and President Clinton in October, 1997. Id. See also Elsaesser, 1996 Am.
Bankr. Inst. J. LEXIS 80 at *9-10 (cited in note 4) (reciting proposals from consumer credit
industry).
13. Over one million Americans filed for bankruptcy in 1996. Saul Hansell, The Debt Trap,
The New York Times 1 (Aug. 25, 1996). Some people blame this trend on a loss of the "stigma"
traditionally associated with bankruptcy, while others fault the credit industry for the "wave of
unsolicited credit-card offers" and for prodding people to spend borrowed money. Id. For an
example of this debate, see generally Who is to Be Blamed for Credit Card Debts, CNN Crossfire
(CNN television broadcast, Dec. 29, 1996).
14. The consumer credit industry has also proposed a requirement for consumers to file
bankruptcy under Chapter 13 and allow conversion to Chapter 7 only if the consumer demonstrates that he could not fund a Chapter 13 repayment plan. Economics, Credit Card News (cited
in note 12). Further discussion of the "mandatory 13" proposal is beyond the scope of this Note.
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the creditor's adherence to the credit card theories. These theories
have created an imbalance in the fraud exception by focusing upon the
debtor seeking discharge and disregarding the creditor claiming fraud.
This Note argues that the common law of fraud should be applied to all credit card cases under section 523(a)(2)(A). The credit
card theories inadequately address the primary elements of fraud: a
debtor's intent when using a credit card and a creditor's reliance when
extending credit. This Note explains how the failure to properly
address these elements permits card-issuers to abuse the fraud
exception and to continue extending credit irresponsibly. Part II of
the Note summarizes the past theories for applying the fraud
exception to credit card debt. Part III describes the problems each
theory has in addressing the elements of a debtor's intent and a
creditor's reliance in the context of current credit card industry
practices. Part IV explains how the common law of fraud improves
upon the credit card theories by ensuring the availability of
bankruptcy for honest debtors and elevating the importance of a cardissuer's reliance. Finally, Part V offers judicial and legislative suggestions for implementing the common law of fraud in credit card nondischargeability actions.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Bankruptcy and the FraudException
The consumer bankruptcy system offers a "fresh start" to the
"honest but unfortunate debtor" by allowing the debtor to discharge
his legal obligations.'5 The discharge of debts, however, is not absolute. Several exceptions exist and these exceptions reflect Congress's
intent to balance certain creditor interests with the "fresh start"
policy. 6 Some creditor interests include select categories of debt, such

15. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 192 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). See also Howard, 48 Ohio St. L. J. at
1047 n.1 (cited in note 3) (describing the history of this often cited proposition from Local Loan
Co. v. Hunt).
16. See Groganv. Garner,498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991) ("Congress evidently concluded that the
creditors' interest in recovering full payment of debts [listed in the statutory provisions
governing non-dischargeability] outweighed the debtors' interest in a complete fresh start.").
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as child support, alimony, certain unpaid educational loans, taxes, and
17
liabilities for fraud.
The policy underlying the fraud exception is two-fold. First,
the fraud exception serves to punish "dishonest" debtors. 8 Second, the
exception protects "honest" or "innocent" creditors. 19 While some have
questioned the wisdom of having this provision in the Bankruptcy
Code, 20 the fraud exception is deeply rooted in bankruptcy law2l and
continues to prevent debtors from abusing the "fresh start" policy.
However, the improper application of the fraud exception in credit
22
card cases permits card-issuers to abuse the Bankruptcy Code.
A creditor seeking exception of a debt from discharge under
section 523(a)(2)(A) must establish its claim by a preponderance of the
evidence.23 Establishing an exception is difficult, though, because
courts favor granting a discharge of debts to effectuate the "fresh
start" policy of the Code. 24 In 1984, Congress responded to pressure
from the consumer credit industry and added section 523(a)(2)(C), the
"load up" provision, which creates a presumption against discharge for
certain types of debt. 25
Few cases have been decided under

17. Id. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1994).
18. Birmingham Trust Nat'lBank v. Case, 755 F.2d 1474, 1477 (11th Cir. 1985).
19. See H.R. Rep. No. 595 at 130 (cited in note 3) (noting that the purpose of the fraud
exception is to protect creditors who "extended credit based on misinformation"). See also Steven
H. Resnicoff, BarringBankruptcy Banditry: Revision of Section 523(a)(2)(C), 7 Bankr. Dev. J.
427, 428-434 (1990) (describing the rationale behind the fraud exception); Steven H. Resnicoff,
Dischargeabilityin Bankruptcy of Debts Incurred by 'PurportedPurchasers", 64 St. John's L.
Rev. 255, 255 (1990) (same).
20. See Luther Zeigler, Note, The Fraud Exception to Discharge in Bankruptcy: A
Reappraisal,38 Stan. L. Rev. 891, 917 (1986) (arguing for the abolition of the fraud exception because it does not punish debtors, corrupts creditor conduct, and only retains a moral "intuitive
appeal").
21. See Field v. Mans, 116 S. Ct. 437, 441, 133 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1995) (tracing the evolution
of the fraud exception from earlier bankruptcy laws).
22. For a general discussion on creditor abuse of the fraud exception see Zeigler, 38 Stan.
L. Rev. at 908-910 (cited in note 20).
23. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 288 (rejecting the "clear and convincing" standard).
24. See, for example, In re McKinnon, 192 B.R. 768, 771 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996) ("It is well
established that exceptions to discharge are to be construed narrowly against creditors, and must
not be allowed to swallow the general rule favoring discharge.").
25. Under the "load up" provision, two types of debt are presumed to be non-dischargeable:
(1) "consumer debts owed to a single creditor and aggregating more than $1,000 for 'luxury goods
or services' incurred by an individual debtor on or within 60 days before the order for relief," and
(2) "cash advances aggregating more than $1,000 that are extensions of consumer credit under
an open end credit plan obtained by an individual debtor on or within 60 days before the order
for relief." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C) (1994). See Nancy C. Dreher and Matthew E. Roy,
Bankruptcy Fraud and NondischargeabilityUnder Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, 69 N.D.
L. Rev. 57, 65-67 (1993) (describing the burden of proof and presumptions related to
§ 523(a)(2)(C)).
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523(a)(2)(C), 26 however, and section 523(a)(2)(A) remains the primary
27
battleground for credit card cases.
B. ConceptualProblems in Credit Card Cases
Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts from discharge any debt obtained
by "false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud."28 Courts
interpret this language to require a creditor to prove five elements: (1)
the debtor made representations; (2) at the time the representations
were made the debtor knew they were false; (3) the debtor made the
representations to deceive the creditor; (4) the creditor relied on the
representations; and (5) the creditor sustained the alleged loss as the
proximate result of the representations. 29 In Field v. Mans, a noncredit card case, the Supreme Court further refined section
523(a)(2)(A) by holding that creditors must prove justifiable reliance
on a debtor's representations.3 0
Essentially, this five-part test
represents the common law of fraud.
Credit card cases have presented problems for courts applying
the five-part fraud exception test because a debtor does not deal faceto-face with the card-issuer. 31 A typical credit card transaction involves a creditor's decision to extend credit to a prospective debtor and
a third party's acceptance of the debtor's subsequent use of the card.

26. See Resnicoff, 7 Bankr. Dev. J. at 440-454 (cited in note 19) (discussing the "failings" of
§ 523(a)(2)(C)). See also In re Fulginiti,201 B.R. 730, 732-33 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (noting the
ease of overcoming the presumptions in § 523(a)(2)(C)).
27. See Dreher and Roy, 69 N.D. L. Rev. at 72 (cited in note 25) ("Probably the most typical
nondischargeability case brought under subsection (a)(2)(A) is the so-called 'credit card case.' ").
28. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).
29. In re Anastas, 94 F.3d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996). Some cases condense these five elements. See, for example, In re Briese, 196 B.R. at 480 (noting three essential elements of falsity,
fraudulent intent, and reliance). See also Drew Frackowiak, The Fallacy of Conflicting Theories
for Analyzing Credit Card Fraud Under 11 USC Section 523(a)(2)(A), 4 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 641,
642 (1995) (discussing the differences in the number of elements courts use and noting that the
essentials remain the same).
30. Field, 116 S.Ct. 437, 444 (1995). Field resolved a circuit split regarding the level of
reliance that a creditor needed to show to exempt a debt from discharge under the fraud
exception. Section 523(a)(2)(A), on its face, does not establish a threshold of reliance, unlike
§ 523(a)(2)(B) which explicitly requires "reasonable" reliance. The Court held that the "actual
fraud" language of § 523(a)(2)(A) requires creditors to show "justifiable" reliance. Id. at 446.
31. It is important to note that, prior to Field, credit card cases typically were not analyzed
under this five-part fraud test. See, for example, In re Murphy, 190 B.R. 327, 331 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill.
1995) (explaining the difficulties courts have had regarding credit card debt and the fraud
exception). See also Susan Elaine Sieger, Mike Vadner, and Brian Watkins, Survey: Fraud as
an Impediment to Discharge-Denial of Discharge and Exceptions to Discharge Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 3 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 469, 515 (1994) (noting the distinction between credit
card cases and other § 523(a)(2)(A) cases).
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The third party then seeks payment from the card-issuer.2 The first
conceptual problem that arises is determining what, if anything, a
debtor represents to a card-issuer when purchasing items from a third
party with a credit card. After establishing a representation to the
card-issuer, the question then becomes how to determine whether the
debtor fraudulently made that representation. Finally, this scenario
forces the question: 'What does a card-issuer rely upon when it extends credit?"
C. Past Theories for Analyzing the Dischargeabilityof
Credit Card Debt
Courts have attempted to resolve the conceptual dilemmas
surrounding a debtor's use of a credit card by creating different theories ("credit card theories") to evaluate the dischargeability of credit
card debt under section 523(a)(2)(A). s3 Although these theories
evolved from attempts to fit credit card transactions into the
traditional five-part fraud test, they have become dispositive inquiries
in many cases. The theories, however, do not fully encompass the two
primary elements of a creditor's fraud claim: intent and reliance.
1. The Implied Representation Theory
.When confronted with a creditor's claim of credit card fraud,
most courts have adopted the "implied representation" theory. 4 These
courts view a debtor's use of a credit card as an implied representation
to the credit card company that he has both the intent and the ability
to pay for the credit.35 The court uses evidence of the debtor's solvency
32. For a more detailed explanation of the tripartite credit card system, see Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Legal and Technological Infrastructuresfor Electronic Payment Systems, 22 Rutgers
Computer & Tech. L. J. 1, 20-24 (1996). Also, see generally, Barkley Clark, The Law of Bank
Deposits and Credit Cards, 11.01-.02 (Warren, Gorham, & Lamont, 3rd ed. 1990).
33. See In re Briese, 196 B.R. at 446 ("[C]ourts have crafted several theories to support
nondischargeability judgments in credit card cases."). One commentator contends that distinguishing these theories is almost irrelevant because courts often use objective factors to determine a cardholder's intent. Frackowiak, 4 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. at 641 (cited
in note 29).
Frackowiak provides good background and descriptions for each credit card theory, but his
argument is superficial. It assumes that courts use these theories only to overcome conceptual
problems regarding a debtor's representations and intent. As such, his argument completely
ignores reliance.
34. See In re Wong, 207 B.R. 822 (Bankr. E.D Pa. 1997) (adhering to "majority" implied
representation theory); In re Briese, 196 B.R. at 446 (noting that the implied representation
theory is the majority approach); In re Cox, 182 B.R. 626, 633 n.23 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) (citing
cases adhering to the implied representation theory).
35. In re Briese, 196 B.R. at 446. There is a slight discrepancy as to whether both intent
and ability to pay are impliedly represented upon credit card usage. See Frackowiak, 4 J. Bankr.
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or insolvency at the time the debtor used the credit card to determine
whether this representation was fraudulent.1
While created to
address the element of representation in a creditor's fraud claim, this
test reduces the five-part fraud analysis solely to an inquiry into the
debtor's intent. This inquiry alone determines whether credit card
37
debt should be excepted from discharge.

2. The Assumption of Risk Theory
A few courts follow the Eleventh Circuit's "assumption of risk"
approach which is less favorable to creditors than the implied representation theory.38 Under this theory, a card-issuer bears the loss of
non-payment from any credit card debt unless the issuer revokes the
card-holder's privileges with notice before the charges are incurred.
This theory presupposes the inherent risk of nonpayment in credit
card transactions which is "factored into the finance charges. 39
Because card-issuers assume this risk, they may recover for fraud only
40
when a debtor uses his credit card after revocation.
3. The Totality of the Circumstances Theory
Finally, many courts follow a "totality of the circumstances" or
"objective test" theory. 41 This is perhaps the most vague test. Under

L. & Prac. at 646-647 (cited in note 29) (noting that majority of cases recognize that ability to pay
is represented with intent to pay). But see In re Lippert, 206 B.R. 136, 139 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1997) (noting that recent cases have limited implied representation to card-holder's intent to

pay).
36. In re Cox, 182 B.R. at 633.
37. See Frackowiak, 4 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. at 646 (cited in note 29) ("The term 'implied
representation' has been expanded into a complete theory of credit card fraud analysis."). See,
for example, In re Van Lyke, 205 B.R. 587, 589 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997) (finding a debt nondischargeable because debtor "knew he was without such ability [to repay the debt], and, as a result, intended to deceive" the creditor, without an analysis of the creditor' reliance when debtor
received credit card with a $5000 limit at nearly the same time he became unemployed).
38. This approach originated in First Nat7 Bank of Mobile v. Roddenberry, 701 F.2d 927
(11th Cir. 1983). In Roddenberry, the debtors owned joint credit cards and exceeded their credit
limit. Despite several warnings from the bank, the debtors continued to use their credit cards,
primarily because they became separated and one of them indulged in a spending spree.
Eventually the bank authorized the revocation of the debtors' cards. Id. at 928-29.
39. Id. at 932.
40. Id.
41. In re McKinnon, 192 B.R. at 773. One scholar has referred to this approach as the
"actual fraud test" and advocated this theory for its "flexibility." Resnicoff, 64 St. John's L. Rev.
at 276, 286 (cited in note 19). Resnicoff, however, failed to describe how the theory encompasses
all the elements of fraud.
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this theory, courts focus on a creditor's ability to prove that a debtor
used a credit card without intending to repay the card-issuer. A
debtor's fraudulent intent is inferred by applying a list of factors to the
particular case. 42 Courts utilize these factors to find either that a
debtor intended to defraud the creditor, or that a debtor should have
43
realized that he would not be able to pay for the credit extended.
This theory modifies the "assumption of risk" theory by evaluating
pre-revocation credit card charges under the "totality" test to determine if they were fraudulently incurred and are thus non-dischargeable.4
D. The Common Law of FraudApplied to Credit Card Cases
The "common law of fraud" approach seeks to avoid the legal
fictions, such as implied representations and inferences from objective
factors, of the other theories by distinctly addressing each element of
fraud for a section 523(a)(2)(A) claim. 45 Under the common law of
fraud, a debtor's use of a credit card is only a representation of his
present intent to pay for the credit extended. 46 This representation is

42. The common list of factors of the objective test theory is:
(1) The length of time between the charges made and the filing of bankruptcy, (2)
Whether or not an attorney has been consulted concerning the filing of bankruptcy before
the charges were made, (3) The number of charges made, (4) The amount of the charges,
(5) The financial condition of the debtor at the time the charges are made, (6) Whether
the charges were above the credit limit of the account, (7) Whether the debtor made
multiple charges on the same day, (8) Whether or not the debtor was employed, (9) The
debtor's prospects for employment, (10) Financial sophistication of the debtor, (11)
Whether there was a sudden change in the debtor's buying habits, and (12) Whether the
purchases were made for luxuries or necessities.
In re Dougherty, 84 B.R. 653, 657 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1988) (citing In re Faulk, 69 B.R. 743, 757
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986)).
43. The Ninth Circuit maintains that the 12 factors are used "to establish the subjective
intent of the debtor...." In re Eashai,87 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 1996). However, objective
factors impede this determination and basically create a reasonableness standard for evaluating
a debtor's intent. In re McKinnon, 192 B.R. at 773. See also In re Alvi, 191 B.R. at 733 (noting
that use of factors detracts from the subjective analysis because one cannot distinguish which
factors are weighted more than others); Frackowiak, 4 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. at 650-54 (cited in
note 29) (arguing for a reasonableness standard as the natural result of cases applying objective
factors).
44. In re Dougherty, 84 B.R. at 657.
45. In re Briese, 196 B.R. at 450. The common law approach was precipitated by the
Supreme Court's 1995 decision in a non-credit card case, Field, 116 S. Ct. at 437. In determining
that § 523(a)(2)(A) required creditors to prove justifiable reliance because of the phrase "actual
fraud," the Court stated that "[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled
meaning under... the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates,
that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms." Id. at 444
(citations omitted).
46. In re Briese, 196 B.R. at 50-51 (citations omitted); In re Murphy, 190 B.R. at 332.
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actionable as fraud if the debtor did not intend to honor it when it was
made. 47 To determine whether a debtor's intent was fraudulent,
courts use a subjective standard that focuses upon the debtor's state of
mind at the time of the representation. 48 In addition, creditors must
prove that their reliance upon the debtor's representation was justifiable.

49

The use of the common law of fraud in credit card non-dischargeability actions presents several concerns. First, courts have not
universally applied the common law of fraud to credit card cases.50
Also, the credit card industry has criticized this approach because it
requires creditors to prove such a high level of reliance. 51 Lastly, the
common law of fraud's subjective evaluation of a debtor's intent conflicts with the consumer credit industry's current proposal to expand
the fraud exception to include debts incurred without a reasonable
expectation of repayment. 52 Nonetheless, the common law of fraud
resolves numerous problems and shortcomings of the alternative
credit card theories.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CREDIT CARD THEORIES

As noted by the court in In re Briese, the common law of fraud
53
resolves several troubling aspects of the other credit card theories.
These problems primarily relate to how each theory examines (or
neglects) the debtor's intent and the creditor's reliance (or lack
47. In re Briese, 196 B.R. at 145 (citing In re Murphy, 190 B.R. at 332). See also
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 530(1) (1976) ("A representation of the maker's own intention to
do or not to do a particular thing is fraudulent if he does not have that intention.").
48. In re Murphy, 190 B.R. at 332. It is "inappropriate" to find that a reasonable cardholder could not have intended to pay for credit. Id. at 333. Instead, courts must determine that
particular debtor's intent. Id.
49. While the Murphy court's opinion is one of the first decisions using the common law approach, it did not address the element of justifiable reliance. Id. at 331 n.4. The definition of
justifiable reliance is still
in flux and will be discussed further in Part IV.B.1.
50. See, for example, In re Leventhal, 194 B.R. 26, 28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying a
motion to dismiss under the "totality of the circumstances" theory and noting that courts do not
need to apply "the classic five elements" of fraud); In re Willis, 190 B.R. 866 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1996) (using the justifiable reliance standard but examining the debtor's intent under an
objective test). See also Gorman, Rethinking Credit Card Fraud at 4-5 (cited in note 9)
(analyzing how courts applying the common law of fraud reach different results).
51. See note 11.
52. See note 12 and accompanying text (discussing proposal).
53. In re Briese, 196 B.R. 440, 449 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 1996). The Briese court also noted
that "[t]he emerging consensus appears to be that none of the approaches fully explains or
resolves the issue of a debtor's fraudulent use (or abuse) of a credit card." Id. at 448.
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thereof) in a credit card transaction. 4 Current industry practices 55
exacerbate these problems and necessitate a new approach for section
523(a)(2)(A) credit card cases which focuses on whether creditors were
truly deceived by cardholders and thereby induced into extending
credit.56
A. InadequateAnalysis of a Debtor's Intent
Each of the credit card theories fails to accurately analyze a
debtor's intent and, therefore, produces undesirable results. The
implied representation theory relieves card-issuers from proving a
debtor's fraudulent intent. This approach condones the credit card
57
industry's tactics of exploitation which drive debtors into bankruptcy.
The totality of the circumstances theory, with its list of factors and
objective analysis of a debtor's intent, also significantly favors cardissuers. 8 Finally, the assumption of risk theory inexplicably disregards the element of intent and exposes card-issuers to increased
losses from fraud.19 Overall, all the theories permit card-issuers to
transform the fraud exception from a means of redressing harm
caused by deceptive debtors into a collection device.

54.

Most courts agree that the use of a credit card satisfies the representation element of a

fraud claim. See Frackowiak, 4 Bankr. L. & Prac. at 646 (cited in note 29) (noting that "there is
little dispute that a cardholder does make a representation when he uses his credit card"). The
only problem lies within the content of the representation which is an issue of the debtor's intent.
But see In re Alvi, 191 Bankr. at 731 ('The use of a credit card to incur debt in a typical credit
card transaction involves no representation, express or implied'); In re Cox, 182 B.R. at 634-36
(same). See also In re Feld, 203 B.R. 360, 366 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (noting that giving a
"literal effect to the statute would be to except credit card transactions from the reach of
§ 523(a)(2)(A)," but declining to follow such cases as In re Alvi and In re Cox which might
"insulate a debtor who fraudulently uses a credit card").
55. See Parts lI.AI1 and HI.B.3.
56. Professor Frackowiak has proposed a "simple, one-prong test: ... Did the debtor have
an intent to deceive the credit card company at the time the card was used?" Frackowiak, 4 J.
Bankr. L. & Prac. at 654 (cited in note 29). Frackowiak maintains that "the elements of
representation and damages can be logically assumed" and argues that his test avoids
addressing the level of reliance required by a creditor, an issue subsequently resolved by the
Supreme Court in Field. Id. at 654 n.109. Because it ignores the element of reliance, this test is
flawed. Professor Frackowiak recently argued his position before the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Nebraska. He represented, not surprisingly, a credit card-issuer. See
Matter of Hiemer, 184 B.R. 345 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995). Ironically, the court found the argument
of the card-issuer "misplaced," partially because the card company had issued the debtor a preapproved credit card while he was in "extensive" debt and after he had been turned down by
another card-issuer. Id. at 348.
57. See Part IIIAL.
58. See Part HI.A.2.
59. See Part IIIA3.
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1. Preferring Card-Issuers under the Implied Representation Theory
Courts following the implied representation theory concentrate
on finding a "false representation" at the expense of analyzing a
debtor's intent. Because courts perceive the use of the credit card as
an implied representation of the debtor's intent and ability to pay for
the charges, a debtor risks becoming a "guarantor" of his financial
condition to a credit card-issuer6 o Courts have equated a breach of
this guarantee, such as not having enough money to pay for the
charges when the card was used, with the fraudulent intent necessary
to except the debt from discharge. 61
This rationale disregards the realities of credit card uses.
People often purchase items with credit cards because they do not
have the ability to pay at that time. 62 Such a transaction does not
necessarily mean that a debtor lacks intent to pay for the purchases. 63
Furthermore, in ascertaining a debtor's ability to pay for credit, courts
do not account for the debtor's ability to pay the minimum payments
required by the card-issuer.64 In other words, courts fail to consider,
for example, that a debtor who incurs $2,500 in charges may need to
pay only $50 within one month. 65 Card-issuers do not claim fraud
when debtors purchase items and make only minimum payments. In
fact, this behavior fuels the credit card industry's profits.66

60. In re Briese, 196 B.R. at 448.
61.
See In re Cox, 182 B.R. at 633 (describing how courts infer fraud from a debtor's
inability to pay).
62. See In re Murphy, 190 B.R. at 332 ("One of the principle reasons people rely on credit is
a present lack of ability to pay."). The practice of paying for items on credit without the present
ability to pay for them is becoming more prevalent. Consumers are now spending $1.10 for every
$1 increase in income. Delinquency on Consumer Loans, Federal News Service (cited in note 4)
(statement of Lawrence Lindsey, Governor, Federal Reserve Board). While 'spending beyond
one's means is imprudent, it should not be classified as fraudulent.
63. One could conceive of numerous situations in which a debtor is unable to pay for
charges at the time they were made yet still intended to repay. One scholar analogized spending
to drug or alcohol addictions and described several organizations that help consumers with
spending problems. Ritzer, ExpressingAmerica at 78-81 (cited in note 4).
64. In re Cox, 182 B.R. at 633.
65. Minimum monthly payments typically range from 2% to 5% of the total balance.
Ritzer, Expressing America at 85 (cited in note 4). However, a $2,500 balance at an annual
percentage rate of 18.5% would take 30 years to pay off with minimum payments of 2%. Id. at
95. Therefore, though a debtor may intend to pay off such a balance, the reasonableness of a
card-issuers' reliance upon promises to repay is questionable as they only encourage minimum
payments. See Part 1V.B (discussing the "justifiable reliance" standard).
66. See note 2 and accompanying text.
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The failure to address a debtor's fraudulent intent as a distinct
element67 of a credit card company's section 523(a)(2)(A) fraud claim
bestows a preferential status upon card-issuers. Other creditors must
prove each and every element of a non-dischargeability claim.6
Of course, simply making credit available does not cause bankruptcy or fraud. Card-issuers, however, engage in deceptive practices
that may affect a debtor's ability to pay for credit without affecting his
intent to pay. For example, card-issuers offer low introductory interest rates, or "teaser rates," which are temporary and induce unwilling
card-holders into obligations to pay higher rates. 9 Also, the calculation of the interest rates in conjunction with various late fees may
result in rates higher than those advertised. 70 Another deceptive
tactic is the "payment holiday" that encourages debtors to skip a
month's payment while heavy finance charges continue to accrue. 71
Even the minimum payment requirement in this scheme is misleading
because it does not advise consumers how long it will take to pay off
their balances. 72 Finally, the credit card companies run various ad73
vertising campaigns to encourage spending.

67. Though mainly a concern when courts use the "implied representation" theory, the
diminished analysis of a debtor's actual intent as a distinct element also surfaces when courts
apply the "totality of the circumstances" theory. In other words, by listing a set of factors
designed to determine a debtor's intent, some courts may decide cases based solely upon these
factors without actually relating them to the specific element of a debtor's fraudulent intent. See
In re Anastas, 94 F.3d at 1286 (recognizing the danger of the 12 factor test becoming "a
substitute for an actual finding of bad faith").
68. In re Briese, 196 B.R. at 448-49. See also In re Hashemi, 104 F.3d 1122, 1122 n.1 (9th
Cir. 1996) ("The outcome of this action will affect other creditors of the bankruptcy estate by
drawing money from the pool of assets available to satisfy the debtor's obligations... affect[ing]
the restructuring of the debtor's relationship with other creditors."). Such a distinction becomes
especially problematic when a debtor may have filed for bankruptcy because of becoming
overextended due to the ease of obtaining credit. According to a recent Visa U.S. survey, most
people cited excessive spending as the main reason for filing for bankruptcy. Hansell, The New
York Times at 1 (cited in note 13).
69. Ritzer, ExpressingAmerica at 96 (cited in note 4). These "teaser rates" are often as low
as 5.9-8.9% for a number of months and then are increased to approximately 16-17%. Ausubel,
70th Annual Meeting of the Natl. Conference of Bankr. Judges at 8-13 (cited in note 2).
70. Ritzer, Expressing America at 94-96 (cited in note 4). For example, the mere
compounding of interest results in a real interest rate of 19.56% when the published rate is 18%.
Id. at 95. Overall, card-issuers generated an estimated $3.1 billion from "hidden fees" in 1995.
Ausubel, 70th Annual Meeting of the Natl. Conference of Bankr. Judges at 8-13 (cited in note 2).
The concern over deceptive interest rates led Rep. Schumer to introduce legislation requiring
credit card companies to print in large type the "true interest" rate. Eda Galeno, Low Rates?
Bill Explains Credit Cards Fine Print,Newsday A16 (Oct. 21, 1996).
71. Ritzer, ExpressingAmerica at 95 (cited in note 4).
72. Id. Congress once considered requiring this information on credit card billing statements, but the movement failed. Id. at 104.
73. See In re McDaniel, 202 B.R. 74 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996) (deeming the bank's practice
of unilaterally raising credit limits and providing "Access Checks" to consolidate credit card debt
to be "commercial entrapment").
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In light of these industry practices, card-issuers should have to
prove a debtor's fraudulent intent without relying on a debtor's insolvency at the time the card was used. Failure to require such proof
from credit card companies effectively condones their deceptive practices that may lead debtors into bankruptcy.
Furthermore, the
implied representation theory is inequitable, as it allows card-issuers
the greatest chance among creditors to attain an exception from
74
discharge.
2. Penalizing Card-Holders under the Totality Test
Unlike the implied representation theory, the totality of the
circumstances theory specifically requires card-issuers to prove a
debtor's fraudulent intent. This theory is flawed, however, due to its
significant bias toward card-issuers. The bias results from a list of
factors and an objective analysis used to determine a debtor's fraudulent intent.
The totality of the circumstances test attempts to overcome
difficulties in proving a card-holder's fraudulent intent 75 by applying a
list of factors to the particular case.76 Its title notwithstanding, the
"totality" test does not account for all relevant facts. Instead, the
theory prescribes a more narrow approach favoring credit card
companies. The theory directs courts to look for elements indicating a
debtor's fraudulent intent and not for any mitigating factors. 77
Potential mitigating factors include a debtor's offer to settle with the
card-issuer, maintenance of minimum payments, and the effect of an
unexpected financial crisis. Each of these factors may influence courts

74. See Zeigler, 38 Stan. L. Rev. at 907 (cited in note 20) ("[lit is inequitable to reward a
possibly imprudent creditor who failed to detect the debtor's misrepresentation by excepting her

debt from discharge, while the debtor's other, more prudent creditors have their claims evaluated

collectively."). This commentator concluded that the fraud exception reduced the level of investigation and thus encouraged debtors to overextend themselves. Id. While it is questionable that
a mere lack of initial investigation causes overextension, it is clear that the deceptive practices of
the credit card industry do encourage and facilitate excessive spending.
75. See, for example, In re Briese, 196 B.R. at 451 ("It is of course difficult, if not impossible, for a plaintiff to present direct evidence of a debtor's intent to deceive."). Presumably the
difficulty results from the lack of contact between the two parties.
76. See note 42 (listing 12-factor test).
77. Courts applying the 12 factors of the totality test often mention that the list of factors
is non-exclusive. See, for example, In re Dougherty, 84 B.R. at 657. This disclaimer, however,
does not eliminate the bias behind this approach and the risk that some courts will weigh the
listed factors more heavily than others.
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a credit card company
to hold that a debtor did not intend to defraud
78
despite the existence of other objective factors.
Underlying the "totality" test is the idea that a reasonable
person standard should govern a debtor's use of credit cards.7 9 The
consumer creditors' proposal regarding the fraud exception expressly
incorporates this reasonableness requirement. 80 A problem arises,
however, when courts try to determine the reasonable use of a credit
card. After all, some people might consider it reasonable to purchase
items while intending to pay only the minimum monthly balance.
Others may think it unreasonable to carry any balance on a credit
card. Credit card-issuers often prefer the former 8 over consumers who
use their credit card and pay their entire balance. '
In addition, evaluating credit card expenditures under a reasonableness standard seems antithetical to the liberal policies of the
"fresh start" in the Bankruptcy Code. By excepting from discharge
"unreasonable" credit card debt, courts may restrict the availability of
bankruptcy too much. As one court has observed, "nearly all bankruptcy debtors... incurred debt at a time when they had an objective
inability to pay."82 Also, one must consider that many unsophisticated
debtors use credit cards. 83 These debtors may lack "reasonable"
financial judgment but should not be considered perpetrators of fraud.
Furthermore, card-issuers have facilitated and encouraged the use of

78. See, for example, In re Anastas, 94 F.3d at 1287 (noting that debtor's attempt to
structure an alternative payment plan while making monthly payments was inconsistent with an
intent to incur debt without repaying); Matter of Hiemer, 184 B.R. at 347 (finding debtor
maintained minimum payments after incurring the last charge and until filing bankruptcy); In re
Valdes, 188 B.R. 533 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995) (finding debtor incurred unforeseen medical and
automobile expenses).
79. See In re McKinnon, 192 B.R. at 773 ("[I]n essence, the totality of the circumstances
theory adopts the 'reasonable man' test.... ."). See also note 43 (same).
80. See note 12 and accompanying text (discussing proposal).
81. Card-issuers discourage "convenience users," consumers who pay off their balance each
month. For example, General Electric implemented a $25 annual charge for customers who do

not carry a balance on their account and who incur less than $25 in annual finance charges.
Patrick Lee, GE to Tack on $25 Fee to Cardholders Who Pay Off Their Balances Promptly, Los
Angeles Times D1 (Sept. 11, 1996).
82. Matter of Hiemer, 184 B.R. at 347. See also In re Karelin, 109 B.R. 943, 948 (9th Cir.
B-.P. 1990) (noting that "debtors incur debts with hopes of repaying them that could be
considered unrealistic in hindsight").
83. See, for example, In re Merritt, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 747 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997), in
which a credit card was issued to a 33-year old with an eighth-grade education. See also Filipow,
58 Ind. L. J. at 332 (cited in note 3) (describing consumers' lack of financial sophistication). See
also Ritzer, Expressing America at 12-15 (cited in note 4) (describing aggressive methods of
soliciting college students who often have not been educated in handling credit responsibly).
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credit cards to purchase necessities.8 Determining the reasonableness of such purchases is problematic to say the least.
Finally, imposing a reasonableness standard could effectively
penalize card-holders for utilizing a credit card instead of another
form of loan. The penalty is that debtors may make only reasonable
investments to obtain a discharge and a complete fresh start. In essence, credit card-issuers are compensating for their lack of inquiry
regarding debtors by asking courts to hold card-holders to a higher
standard of care. The use of a credit card instead of financing should
matter little regarding the debtor's intent to pay for the credit
extended. 85
Evaluating credit card debtors under an objective
standard, though, increases judicial evaluation of an individual's
investment choices rather than allowing creditors to make such evaluations before extending credit. This analysis detracts from any honesty and the actual intent of the debtor.
3. Disregarding a Debtor's Intent under the Assumption of
Risk Theory
Contrary to both the implied representation and totality of the
circumstances theories, the assumption of risk theory detrimentally
affects credit card-issuers. While accounting for the deceptive practices of the credit card industry, the theory entirely disregards the
truly dishonest card-holder who defrauds a card-issuer. 86 This
disregard for the debtor's intent proves troublesome because it permits
a debtor to commit fraud without repercussions until a card-issuer
discovers the fraud and revokes the debtor's credit card. Some courts
also have suggested that this test misplaces the focus of the fraud
exception on the "improvident creditor."87

This point is tenuous

considering the methods card-issuers use to increase debt spending,
84.

See Ritzer, ExpressingAmerica at 82 (cited in note 4) (calling for credit card industry to

stop inducing people to buy essentials with credit cards). Classifying the purchase of necessities
as an exception to discharge attenuates the principles of fraud when the card-holder still intends
to pay for the credit extended. See, for example, In re Valdes, 188 B.R. at 539 ("All but one of the
[debtor's] purchases were for necessities.").
85. For an example of cases where credit cards were used to finance business activities see
In re McKinnon, 192 B.R. at 768 (incurring credit card debt to finance a book on the history of the
Russian space program); In re Bermingham, 201 B.R. 808 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996) (incurring
credit card debt in furtherance of"free-lance sculptor" work in preparation for a convention). In
both cases, the debts were declared non-dischargeable under a subjective analysis of each
debtor's intent to repay the debt.
86. See In re Briese, 196 B.R. at 449 (noting room for manipulation by dishonest debtors).

87.

In re Dougherty, 84 B.R. at 657.
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but the injustice of barring a creditor from recovering losses if it can
prove a debtor's fraudulent intent and justify its reliance on the
debtor's representations.
4. Overall Bias Encourages Frivolous Lawsuits
As demonstrated, all of the credit card theories inadequately
analyze a debtor's intent when using a credit card. Because most
courts follow either the implied representation theory or the totality of
the circumstances theory, judicial analysis of credit card fraud under
section 523(a)(2)(A) has favored card-issuers. Continued analysis
under these theories improvidently expands the fraud exception into a
collection device for credit card companies.
The mere existence of the fraud exception provides credit cardissuers considerable leverage over card-holders. 8 This leverage
permits card-issuers to obtain settlements outside of the bankruptcy
process on what may often be dischargeable debt.89 By not forcing
credit card companies to clearly establish a debtor's actual fraudulent
intent, courts provide more leverage to card-issuers by facilitating
successful "fraud" actions. Thus, the fraud exception may become
another step for card-issuers in the collection process before they
classify debts as uncollectible.
As bankruptcies increase, courts can expect more fraud claims
based solely on a card-issuer's mechanical analysis of the totality
test's factors.90 The failure to adequately analyze a debtor's intent
when using a credit card encourages creditors to bring fraud claims
without any prior investigation. 91 As a result, the number of meritless
88. See Zeigler, 38 Stan. L. Rev. at 910 (cited in note 20) ("Moreover, creditors can exploit
the exception without going to court; often the mere threat of a fraud action will convince a
debtor to pay off a debt or to enter into a reaffirmation agreement").
89. See, for example, In re Bermingham, 201 B.R. at 815-16 (noting incentives of both
parties to settle dischargeability proceedings, thus requiring greater scrutiny into consent
judgments because they may saddle debtors with obligations they are unable to pay); In re
Grayson, 199 B.R. 397 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996) (same).
90. The rote application of these factors by credit card-issuers expecting exception without
inquiry into a debtor's actual intent is exemplified in In re Chinchilla,202 B.R. 1010 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1996). The court imposed attorney's fees and costs against the creditor, AT&T Universal
Card Services Corp., because the creditor's allegations of fraud were not "substantially justified."
Id. at 1017. The court noted that AT&T relied upon the Dougherty factors in basing its fraud
claim, but these factors "[did] not come close to presenting a picture of deceptive conduct,"
primarily because AT&T did not investigate its claim prior to filing. Id. at 1018 (citation
omitted). Such investigation would have revealed a "critical fact": The debtor's spouse had
become disabled, and as a result unemployed, after the alleged fraudulent credit card purchases
and that is what caused the bankruptcy. Id. at 1017.
91. See, for example, In re Grayson, 199 B.R. at 397 (awarding attorney's fees against a
credit card company in two suits because of failure to examine debtors before bringing suit, one
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claims creditors bring will likely increase the wasting of judicial
resources.
B. Failureto Analyze a Card-Issuer'sReliance
Courts have found that reliance is the most difficult of the
523(a)(2)(A) standards to apply to credit card transactions.9 2 As a
result, courts have largely ignored card-issuers' reliance upon a
debtor's representation in credit card fraud cases. 9 3 Although the
Supreme Court has established the justifiable reliance requirement
for claimants under section 532(a)(2)(A), 94 the credit card theories do
not ensure proper use of this standard.9 5 Considering current credit

of which it later tried to dismiss upon contestation by the debtor); In re Stansel, 203 B.R. 339,
344 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (awarding attorney fees against a credit card company for failing to
investigate its § 523(a)(2)(A) claim).
92. In re Feld, 203 B.R. at 368. See also Daniel R. Cowans, 2 Bankr. L. & Prac. § 6.29
(West, 6th ed. 1994) ("The issuance of credit cards to a debtor raises new problems in terms of reliance").
93. The analysis of reliance has also been scant in academia. See, for example, Resnicoff,
64 St. John's L. Rev. at 274 (cited in note 19) ("There is no theoretical basis for characterizing as
unreasonable a card-issuer's reliance on a debtor's initial intent to pay."); Dreher and Roy, 69
N.D. L. Rev. 57 (cited in note 25); Resnicoff, 7 Bankr. Dev. J. at 463 n.166 (cited in note 19)
(recommending extension of § 523(a)(2)(C) time periods and a per se denial of discharge if
creditors prove that "no reasonable debtor could reasonably have expected to pay the debt
without failing to pay his other debts" and dismissing criticism of creditors' lending practices);
Frackowiak, 4 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. at 642 (cited in note 29) ("Fortunately, the issue of reliance is
not a subject of this article.").
Some commentators have addressed the reliance concerns.
For the most thorough
discussion, see generally Filipow, 58 Ind. L. J. at 319 (cited in note 3). It is important to realize
that the Filipow Note predates the advent of the credit card theories because to address the
reliance concerns of credit card-issuers, one must first resolve the problems of how courts are
currently handling these cases. Also, Filipow speaks of acquiescence as a defense to a creditor's
claim rather than addressing the element of reliance as an integral part of that creditor's claim.
While a seemingly small distinction, more emphasis placed on reliance to prove a fraud claim
may deter meritless claims and prevent the need to defend them by claiming that a creditor
acquiesced. Finally, Filipow disagrees with the "balancing approach, [of] weighing the
culpability of the debtor and the creditor...." Id. at 334. Filipow argues instead for more
"responsibility" on the creditor to prevent credit card abuse. Id. As it turns out, the Note more
or less advocates the "assumption of risk" theory. This theory is not the solution to problems
with the fraud exception, however. Instead, the balance of interests is essential and must be
restored. See also Zeigler, 38 Stan. L. Rev. at 908-10 (cited in note 20) (addressing creditor abuse
of the fraud exception).
94. Field, 116 S. Ct. at 446.
95. Not only is it unclear whether principles of justifiable reliance can co-exist with the
past credit card theories, but apparently not all courts have utilized the justifiable reliance
standard in credit card cases. See, for example, In re Burns, 196 B.R. 11 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996)
(not mentioning Field or justifiable reliance); In re Haji, 201 B.R. 176 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (same);
In re Berry, 197 B.R. 382, 383 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (declining summary judgment without
reference to reliance despite noting the "pre-approved unsolicited" credit card). See also note 50.
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card industry practices, the inconsistent treatment of a card-issuer's
96
reliance in fraud claims cannot continue.

1. Foreclosing Reliance under the Assumption of Risk Theory
The assumption of risk theory, the minority approach among
the credit card theories, 97 attempts to address the reliance concerns
involved in credit card transactions. For example, the court in First
National Bank of Mobile v. Roddenberry9s properly questioned
whether a card-issuer relied on any debtor representations regarding
repayment of charges. The court noted that banks factor the nonpayment of debts into their finance charges. A conceptual problem
arises: How can a card-issuer claim that a card-holder's non-payment
deceived the issuer when it expects some people to default?
By establishing a bright-line standard denying recovery absent
revocation of the debtor's credit card, the assumption of risk theory
forecloses the possibility of a card-issuer establishing any reliance. No
matter how closely a card-issuer investigates debtors prior to issuing a
credit card or how closely the issuer monitors its accounts, the issuer
will fail to recover pre-revocation fraudulent charges. 99 This result is
particularly troubling in light of a recent Ninth Circuit case where a
card-holder engaged in a deliberate credit card "kiting" scheme. 1° 0 In
such cases, the most careful creditor may fail to detect the fraud
before incurring substantial losses. 10 Denying recovery to a creditor
able to prove his own "innocence" as well as the debtor's "dishonesty"
does not advance the policies behind the Bankruptcy Code or the fraud
exception.

96. See Part III.B.3 (discussing current industry practices).
97. See, for example, In re Wong, 207 B.R. at 822.
98. 701 F.2d 927, 932 (11th Cir. 1983). The Roddenberry court also noted that "banks have
a definite interest in permitting charges beyond established credit limits because of the high
finance charges typical in such transactions." Id.
99. In re Dougherty, 84 B.R. at 656. See also In re Shanahan, 151 B.R. 44, 47 (Ba.akr.
W.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that card-issuers do not assume the risk of fraud).
100. In re Eashai, 87 F.3d at 1082. The debtor owned 26 credit cards and used cash
advances from some cards to maintain minimum payments on the others until he depleted his
credit limits by amassing over $100,000 in unsecured debt. Id. at 1085-86.
101. The "kiting" scheme clearly disturbed the Eashai court because no "red flags" would
warn the creditor of the fraud. Id. at 1091. However, the court focused on this point to the
exclusion of the fact that the creditor awarded a $20,000 credit line to a debtor whose yearly
income was around $24,000. See text accompanying note 150 (discussing required showing of
reliance under justifiable reliance standard). Nonetheless, this "kiting" scheme raises legitimate
concerns for any creditor.
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2. Neglect and Confusion in Analyzing Reliance under the Implied
Representation and Totality of the Circumstances Theories
Most courts do not follow the assumption of risk theory, and, as
a result, they often disregard any proof of a card-issuer's reliance in
section 523(a)(2)(A) credit card cases. Similar to the assumption of
risk theory, other credit card theories disregard the need to prove
card-issuers' reliance. For example, the implied representation theory
allows credit card companies to imply reliance. 10 2 Ironically, despite
its development from criticism of the implied representation theory's
inferences, the totality test does not specifically address the element of
reliance either.1° 3 In fact, the totality test lists only factors to help
establish a debtor's intent but offers none regarding the element of a
creditor's reliance.104
Besides flaws within the credit card theories themselves, a
circuit split regarding the level of reliance required in section
523(a)(2)(A) actions 05 has contributed to the absence of a uniform
method for analyzing a card-issuer's reliance.
Courts requiring
creditors to demonstrate only actual reliance have more or less disregarded the reliance element of their fraud claim. 1°6 Presumably, a
card-issuer satisfies actual reliance by merely paying the merchant for
the credit extended. In this context, some courts have addressed
reliance problems under the guise of intent as illustrated by the court
0 7
in In re Sigrist.l

102. See In re Murphy, 190 B.R. at 331 n.4 ("Many courts also created an implied reliance
theory.").
103. See In re Dougherty, 84 B.R. at 656 (criticizing the implied representation theory but
noting that, "[i]n third party credit card transactions ....the concepts of representation and
reliance have little meaning"). See also In re Cox, 182 B.R. at 637 (citing In re Dougherty as an
example of courts that "state reliance is necessary and then ignore the requirement altogether");
In re Akdogan, 204 B.R. 90, 96 n.4 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that the "totality" test
"spurn[s] all notion of adherence to the traditional five elements of fraud").
104. Compare In re Dougherty, 84 B.R. at 657 (listing 12-factor test), with In re Kahler, 187
B.R. 508, 514 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996) (non-credit card case citing factors to determine a creditor's
reasonable reliance).
105. See Field, 116 S. Ct. at 445 (describing the circuit split on the level of reliance).
106. See, for example, In re Hinman, 120 B.R. 1018, 1022 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1990) ("Reliance
on the part of the issuer is inherent in the system....f).
107. 163 B.R. 940 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1994). See also In re Burns, 196 B.R. at 12-14
(following Sigrist); In re Davis, 176 B.R. 118, 120 n.2 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[I]ndustry
practices are relevant in assessing consumer expectations and the intent behind conduct... "
(emphasis added)). Additionally, courts have questioned credit card companies' practices without
relating these concerns to any part of the fraud test. See, for example, In re Hiemer, 184 B.R. at
348 (noting that the debtor received a pre-approved credit card while having "extensive" debt on
17 other credit cards but not describing any effect on the issuer's reliance).
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In Sigrist a bank issued a "pre-approved" credit card to an
insolvent debtor. Under the totality of circumstances theory, the court
held that the plaintiffs decision to lend to an insolvent debtor
disallowed any inference of fraud based on the insolvency.108 The
Sigrist court did not mention the effect of the card-issuer's actions on
the legitimacy of its reliance upon the debtor's represented intent to
pay. 0 9
The courts that require "reasonable" reliance under section
523(a)(2)(A) consider more carefully whether a card-issuer relied upon
a card-holder's representations when extending credit. Most reliance
problems relate to the card-issuer's practice of distributing "preapproved" credit cards. The Sixth Circuit's decision in In re Ward
remains the leading case regarding this problem. In Ward, a credit
card company issued a pre-approved credit card without conducting a
credit check on a debtor who was in debt on twelve other credit
accounts and had once been convicted of embezzlement.110 The Ward
court modified the Roddenberry assumption of risk theory by holding
that a credit check must be conducted at some point; otherwise, an
exception to discharge is unavailable.", Some courts follow Ward and
require credit card-issuers to carefully analyze debtors' credit histories
when issuing "pre-approved" cards." 2 Other decisions indicate that
1 13
reasonable reliance entails monitoring the account in question.
Despite these examples of thorough inquiry into a card-issuer's

108. In re Sigrist, 163 B.R. at 949.
109. In fact, the Sigrist court previously noted that "the reasonableness or unreasonableness
of the lender's decision to lend is totally irrelevanf' to its claim of fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A). Id.
at 948.
110. In re Ward, 857 F.2d 1082 (6th Cir. 1988).
111. Id. at 1085. In other words, without a credit check, a card-issuer assumes the risk of
non-payment. The simple requirement of a credit check, however, may not prevent the careless
distribution of credit cards. See, for example, In re Briese, 196 B.R. at 442 (discussing situation
in which a credit card company issued a "pre-approved" credit card after conducting a credit
check despite the debtors' obligations equaling nearly two-thirds of their income).
112. Courts are often concerned that creditors do not seek sufficient information when soliciting "pre-approved" credit cards. See, for example, In re Pressgrove, 147 B.R. 244, 247 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 1992) (noting that creditors must evaluate the debtor's ability to pay and that the
information on pre-approved applications, such as name, address, employer, and salary, is
insufficient); In re Leonard, 158 B.R. 839, 844 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1993) (creditor only requested
name, social security number, and telephone number to grant debtor a $7,500 credit line).
113. See, for example, In re Carrier,181 B.R. 742, 749 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (recognizing
the "twofold" inquiry of issuance and monitoring to establish reasonable reliance). See also In re
Foley, 156 B.R. 645 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1993) (holding reasonable reliance established by history of
regular monthly payments).
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reliance under the "reasonableness" standard, however, some courts
still pay only "lip service" to the reliance element. 114
In summary, whether due to the inadequacies of the credit card
theories or the circuit split regarding the requisite level of reliance, no
uniform approach for addressing the reliance element of a card-issuer's fraud claim exists. Furthermore, aside from the handful of
cases utilizing the "reasonable reliance" requirement, the majority of
cases fail to sufficiently analyze a card-issuer's reliance when extending credit.
3. Current Credit Card Industry Practices Require
Inquiry into Reliance
The current practices of the credit card industry demand that
courts thoroughly analyze a card-issuer's reliance to determine
whether a debtor's fraudulent representation induced the card-issuer
to extend credit. After all, a fraud claim requires a plaintiff's reliance
upon a representation to be a "substantial factor in bringing about the
loss." Several industry practices cast doubt on whether card-issuers
routinely meet this requirement when they claim fraud. While these
practices will be explained more thoroughly," 6 it is helpful to briefly
enunciate them here.
The most obvious industry practice calling a card-issuer's reliance into question is the "pre-approved" credit card. In 1995, "banks
mailed out 2.7 billion pre-approved credit-card solicitations, or roughly
17 offers to every American aged 18 to 64... ."117 The indiscriminate
nature in which issuers distribute credit cards should affect their
claims of fraud, but no consistent approach has emerged.118 Besides
"pre-approved" solicitations, credit card-issuers also engage in other
activities which should lead courts to question the extent of the

114. See, for example, In re McDonald, 177 B.R. 212, 217 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994)

("Reasonable reliance is present if the creditor's actual conduct was consistent with normal
business practices in the industry...."). In McDonald, a card-issuer was found to have
reasonably relied on a debtor's representations of intent to pay for credit despite issuing a "preapproved" credit card with a $5000 limit to a debtor with a $415 monthly income from welfare
and child support. Id. at 214.
115. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 537 cmt. a (1976).
116. See Part W.B.1.
117. Hays, Wall St. J. at B1 (cited in note 2).
118. See Cowans, 2 Bankr. L. & Prac. § 6.30 (cited in note 92) (noting the problems of the
"pre-approved" credit card). But see In re Sigrist, 163 B.R. at 949 (noting that "relatively few
[cases] have focused upon the legal significance of pre-approval").
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creditor's reliance on a debtor's representations. Some of these other
activities include: soliciting card-holders who already own numerous
credit cards, setting exorbitant credit limits, requiring only minimum
payments for an account to be considered "current," and unilaterally
extending a debtor's credit limit.
By failing to require a credit card-issuer to demonstrate a level
of reliance above "actual reliance," courts discourage prudent lending
through credit cards 19 and have led issuers to believe that a debtor's
intent is the exclusive element of a fraud claim. 120 Card-issuers have
little incentive to set reasonable credit limits or to issue credit cards
carefully as long as they may use the court system to collect from
debtors by focusing solely on their conduct. This concern intensifies as
the credit card industry lobbies Congress for an objective standard of
would codify the current
evaluating a debtor's intent. Such a proposal
2
focus of the fraud exception on the debtor.' '
C. Summary: An Imbalance in the FraudException
22
Because credit cards play such a major role in our economy,
the imbalance in the fraud exception resulting from the credit card
theories must be corrected. From a debtor's point of view, the consequences of remaining liable for credit card debt are very significant
and can ruin the hope of a "fresh start." Courts should, therefore,
ensure that only "dishonest" debtors are punished under the fraud
exception. Furthermore, card-issuers should not be "rewarded" with23
an exception to discharge when they were not "innocent" creditors.
Given the problems plaguing courts applying the credit card theories
to the fraud exception, courts should initiate their own "fresh start" in
analyzing whether credit card debt is non-dischargeable under section
523(a)(2)(A).

119. See Delinquency on Consumer Loans, Federal News Service (cited in note 4) (testimony
of George M. Salem, securities analyst) (criticizing the weak underwriting of credit card lenders).
120. See, for example, In re Akdogan, 204 B.R. at 92 ("Plaintiff seems to argue that it is
entitled to proceed to trial based solely on the issue of the Debtor's intent.... ."). Despite finding
for the debtor, the Akdogan court, in denying attorney fees, also stated that the creditor's
"position that nondischargeability lawsuits under § 523(a)(2)(A) revolve exclusively upon the
Debtor's intent is not without precedent." Id. at 98.
121. See Part IV.
122. See Hansell, The New York Times at 1 (cited in note 13) ('[Consumer credit] now totals
nearly $1.2 trillion, of which $350 billion is on credit cards.").
123. Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, As We Forgive
Our Debtors 189 (Oxford U., 1989) (questioning the "moral implication of rewarding the creditor
who was also irresponsible in granting the credit").
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IV. THE SOLUTION-THE COMMON LAW OF FRAUD

The common law of fraud requires a creditor to address each
primary element of a section 523(a)(2)(A) claim, namely intent and
reliance. 124 The common law of fraud's subjective analysis of a debtor's

intent and its requirement of justifiable reliance also redresses the
inadequate analysis other credit card theories have given these two
elements. Furthermore, this theory remedies the problem of credit
card-issuers gaining preferential status among creditors.
A. Evaluation of the Subjective Intent Standard
In light of the problems of objectively analyzing a debtor's intent, a subjective standard seems preferable. A subjective standard
does not provide an inference of fraud from a debtor's insolvency, nor
does it prejudice debtors by holding them to a higher standard of care
for using a credit card. Instead, a subjective standard focuses on the
honesty of the debtor. While difficult for card-issuers to satisfy, a
subjective standard does not allow debtors to avoid their credit card
debt easily. In addition, because a subjective standard removes the
bias favoring issuers, it restores balance to the fraud exception and
elevates the importance of establishing justifiable reliance when
claiming fraud.
1. Section 523(a)(2)(A) Remains a Viable Exception
When properly articulated,125 a subjective standard focuses on
the honesty of debtors and deters card-issuers from using the fraud
exception as an improper collection device.
The Ninth Circuit best described the subjective test of a
debtor's intent as a question of whether the debtor "maliciously and in
bad faith" incurred credit card debt with the intention of petitioning
for bankruptcy and avoiding the debt. 26 To find this subjective intent,

124. See Part I.D (discussing application of the common law of fraud to credit card cases).
125. While seemingly a rhetorical exercise, describing the subjective standard is important
because courts often confuse it with an objective standard, and the difference between the two
approaches may be outcome determinative. See In re Murphy, 190 B.R. at 332 ("Courts have

commonly confused these standards."). The Murphy court noted that the debtor, a gambler,
might have unreasonably relied on his gambling to pay off his debt. Nonetheless, because he
honestly believed he would be able to pay, the court granted the discharge. Id. at 334.
126. In re Anastas, 94 F.3d at 1286 (emphasis added). In Anastas, a debtor financed gam-

bling on credit cards and accumulated over $40,000 in debt. Ironically, the creditor in Anastas is
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courts may use objective factors as circumstantial evidence, but should
not rely on a list of such factors to find bad faith.127 Without a list of
factors, courts can focus on a debtor's "credibility" rather than his
reasonableness or financial ability to pay. 128
Although card-issuers are bound to disagree, the evaluation of
a debtor's intent under a subjective standard has intuitive appeal. If a
court denies a bankrupt debtor the ability to discharge his or her debt,
then the court should find that debtor truly dishonest. Bankruptcy
should not be restricted to the reasonable but unfortunate debtor;
instead, the honesty of a debtor should be at issue. 129 Reducing the
fraud exception to a mechanical formula based on reasonableness
eviscerates this principle, especially when the reasonableness of using
a credit card is not indicative of the card-holder's intent to pay.
Lastly, a subjective standard fosters more careful litigation of credit
card cases because issuers are required to produce specific evidence to
establish a debtor's fraudulent intent and therefore must investigate
debtors before alleging fraud.
2. Dismissing the Idea of an "Escape Hatch" for Debtors
Credit card companies may claim that by requiring proof of a
debtor's actual intent to defraud the creditor, courts have created an

appealing the Ninth Circuit's reversal of the finding that the debt was non-dischargeable because
it feels the court based its holding on the debtor's credibility. The lower court did not examine
the debtor's intent to pay but instead based its decision on the debtor's ability to pay. The
creditor felt the Ninth Circuit's reversal was based on its belief in the debtor's credibility rather
than a legal argument because the debtor appealed the case pro se. 6 Consumer Bankr. News
(Oct. 21, 1996). However, the legal rule adopted by the Ninth Circuit correctly revolves around
the debtor's credibility and honesty.
127. See In re Murphy, 190 B.R. at 333-34 (describing how application of a list of factors
"clouds" the fact-finding process). This is not to say that courts using these factors cannot list
them and determine the subjective intent of a debtor. See, for example, In re Eashai, 87 F.3d at
1091 (utilizing the 12 factor approach to establish the debtor's subjective intent). It is
significant, though, that the Ninth Circuit, in its next opinion, refused to rely on the 12 factors
and, instead, emphasized that the 12 factor test is useful but should never supplant an actual
finding of bad faith. In re Anastas, 94 F.3d. at 1286. Furthermore, the use of "maliciousness"
and "bad faith" signifies a departure from objective criteria. Id. Finally, these terms relate to
the opinion of In re Faulk, which promulgated the 12 factor test. 69 B.R. at 743. The Faulk
court noted that fraud involved "moral turpitude or an intentional wrong" and "consist[ed] of any
deceit, artifice, trick or design ... used to circumvent or cheat another...." Id. at 750.
Unfortunately, the 12 factors from Faulk are cited more often than this language defining fraud.
128. See, for example, In re Briese, 196 B.R. at 453 (discharge granted because
debtor/gambler had "an honest, if questionable and undoubtedly foolish, belief that she could win
enough to pay her debts").
129. In In re Alvi, the court stated: "The issue is the Debtor's subjective intent to repay the
debt. Debtors can honestly, but mistakenly, believe that they have the ability to repay their
debts." 191 B.R. at 733.
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easy method for debtors to avoid their credit card obligations. This
concern is unfounded. A creditor need prove only that a debtor had
the requisite fraudulent intent by a preponderance of the evidence. 10
Several creditors have met this standard and successfully proven
different debtor's fraudulent intentions."'s
Perhaps the creditors' real concern regarding a subjective standard is the impropriety of discharging certain types of debt. For
example, gambling debts are often dischargeable under the subjective
standard. 32 In other words, gamblers often intend to pay for cash
advances even when this belief is unreasonable. 3 In these situations
card-issuers are not without solutions. First, issuers could propose to
amend the Bankruptcy Code to account for gambling debt.34 Though
appealing on its face, this suggestion fails to consider that gamblers
who file for bankruptcy do not always do so because of their gambling
habits; instead, external events may upset a gambler's precarious
financial situation.3 5 A better solution would be for card-issuers to
perform proper credit checks, establish lower credit lines, and restrict
cash advances, thereby reducing the likelihood that gamblers will
abuse their credit cards. 136 Card-issuers, however, do not appear too

130. Grogan,498 U.S. at 287; In re Murphy, 190 B.R. at 334.
131. See, for example, In re Hashemi, 104 F.3d at 1122 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding fraudulent

intent when debtor incurred $60,000 of credit card debt in a six week trip prior to bankruptcy); In
re Eashai,87 F.3d at 1082 (finding fraudulent intent in credit card "kiting" scheme); In re Feld,
203 B.R. at 371 (finding debtor to be "an unbelievable witness" because of "uncertain [and]
incomplete" testimony); In re Jacobs, 196 B.R. 429 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1996) (finding debtor to
have subjective fraudulent intent using evidence deemed admitted from failure to respond to
requests for admissions). Of course, one should not expect an overwhelming number of cases
finding a debtor's fraudulent intent because, contrary to popular belief, filing for bankruptcy is a
serious action for individuals and is not often abused. See Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook, As
We Forgive Our Debtors at 329 (cited in note 123) ("A small group, perhaps 5% of all bankrupt
debtors, might be abusing the system.").
132. For cases discharging gambling debt on credit cards, see In re Briese, 196 B.R. at 440;
In re Murphy, 190 B.R. at 27; In re Alvi, 191 B.R. at 724; Matter of Totina, 198 B.R. 673 (Bankr.
E.D. La. 1996).
133. See, for example, In re Murphy, 190 B.R. at 334 (finding that when "the Debtor
incurred the debts at issue he intended to repay them and believed (however unreasonably) that
he would have the means to do so....").
134. See In re Alvi, 191 B.R. at 733 n.19 ("If Congress intended for all debts incurred in
connection with gambling to be found non-dischargeable, it could have done so."). See generally
David S. Kennedy and James E. Bailey, Gambling and the Bankruptcy Code.- An Historical
Exegesis and Case Survey, 11 Bankr. Dev. J. 49 (1994-95).
135. See, for example, In re Alvi, 191 B.R. at 727-78 (finding gambler's loss of job contributing to bankruptcy).
136. See Ritzer, ExpressingAmerica at 70 (cited in note 4) (noting the invitation to gambling
by not restricting cash advances); In re Alvi, 191 B.R. at 728 (noting that the debtor incurred 75%
of debt from cash advances at casinos).
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concerned with gambling. They provide easy access to cash advances
and even permit debtors to purchase playing chips and tokens on
13 7
credit in casinos.
One last avenue for issuers to pursue in reducing the gambling
debt discharged in bankruptcy lies in the presumptions against
discharge in section 523(a)(2)(C). "1 8 Under section 523(a)(2)(C), courts
presume that cash advances taken within sixty days of filing for
bankruptcy are non-ischargeable. 139 Perhaps courts could extend
these time limits. Creditors still need to closely monitor their
accounts to take advantage of this presumption. Extending the time
limits for presumptions against discharge, though, encourages
creditors to pay less attention to their accounts. Once again, a
creditor's best solution to avoid the discharge of gambling debt would
be to change its own procedures instead of the Bankruptcy Code.
3. New Emphasis on Reliance
Given the difficulties of proving a debtor's intent under a
subjective standard, 140 a creditor's reliance enhances his fraud claim
under section 523(a)(2)(A). In other words, a card-issuer's fraud claim
is most persuasive if the issuer could not have taken any action to
prevent its loss. Furthermore, a creditor should be able to produce
more evidence of a debtor's subjective intent when that creditor has
justifiably relied upon the debtor's representations. Therefore, the
subjective standard further balances the interests of debtors and
creditors with greater focus on creditors' conduct when determining
whether a card-holder committed fraud under section 523(a)(2)(A).
B. Evaluationof the JustifiableReliance Standard
The justifiable reliance standard of the common law of fraud
corrects the deficiencies the alternative credit card theories have in
analyzing the conduct of credit card-issuers who invoke section
523(a)(2)(A). Under the justifiable reliance standard, a credit card
company must explain why it thought a debtor would make good on its

137. For example, over the summer of 1996, the New Jersey Control Commission voted to

allow credit cards to be used to purchase playing chips and tokens in Atlantic City. Delinquency
of Consumer Loans, Federal News Service (cited in note 4) (statements of Rep. LaFalce).
138. See note 25 and accompanying text.
139. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C).
140. These difficulties include the absence of an inference of fraud from a debtor's insolvency
and the requirement of finding an actual intent to deceive by the debtor rather than mere
unreasonable use of a credit card.
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representation of intent to pay for charges incurred and not just
demonstrate actual reliance on the debtor's payment to the merchant.
1. Defining Justifiable Reliance in Credit Card Cases
The Supreme Court in Field v. Mans identified two attributes
of justifiable reliance.
First, justifiable reliance is a subjective
analysis of a creditor.'14 Second, justifiable reliance requires more
than actual reliance42 as a creditor must "use his senses, and cannot
recover if he blindly relies upon a misrepresentation the falsity of
which would be patent to him if he had utilized his opportunity to
make a cursory examination or investigation."'' 4 As one bankruptcy
court has noted, though, "[h]olding that proof of justifiable reliance is
required and articulating what that reliance would be in a credit card
situation are far different matters."'144
The most evident feature of cases in which courts have applied
the justifiable reliance standard to section 523(a)(2)(A) credit card
cases is that a failure to produce any evidence of reliance is fatal to
the fraud claim.145 Additionally, the justifiable reliance standard
permits courts to consider the differing circumstances to determine
whether the card-issuer was deceived by a debtor's use of a credit card
and the ensuing failure to pay for credit extended. 46 These circumstances include, for example, the industry practices of issuing "preapproved" credit cards, allowing minimum payments to make accounts
"current," and unilaterally raising a debtor's credit limit.

141. Justifiable reliance "is a matter of the qualities and characteristics of the particular
plaintiff, and the circumstances of the particular case, rather than of the application of a community standard of conduct to all cases." Field, 116 S. Ct. at 444 (citing Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 545A cmt. b) (1976).
142. See Part H.B.2 (explaining actual reliance).
143. Field, 116 S. Ct. at 444 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 541 cmt. a (1976)). See
also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 537 (1976) (describing justifiable reliance).
144. In re Feld, 203 B.R. at 369.
145. See, for example, In re Christensen, 193 B.R. 863, 867 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1996)
("[B]ecause American Express presented no evidence indicating any reliance on the debtor's
representation [of an intent to pay in the future], the bankruptcy court was entirely justified in
discharging [the debtor's] credit card debt."); In re Richards, 196 B.R. 481, 482 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
1996) (stating that "the creditor cannot completely ignore its burden with regard to [the
justifiable reliance] element of the cause of action").
146. Some courts have held that the use of a credit card is a unilateral contract and,
therefore, reliance must be judged upon each use of the card. See, for example, In re Anastas, 94
F.3d at 1285 (holding that each credit card transaction forms unilateral contract).
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a. Issuance of Credit Cards
As previously mentioned, the most prevalent reliance concern
regarding card-issuers claiming fraud is the distribution of "pre-approved" credit cards. 147 By requiring justifiable reliance, courts ensure

that issuers may not recover under "fraud" when they distribute credit
cards in a careless manner and are not induced into extending credit.
The justifiable reliance standard generally requires no investigation. 148 Superficially, upon issuing a credit card, a card-issuer has
no obligations affecting its reliance upon future representations by the
card-holder. Justifiable reliance, however, has a common sense requirement. The standard requires a claimant to detect "obvious"
errors by using its "senses."19

The standard thus requires a

sophisticated card-issuer to conduct at least a "cursory investigation"
of a person's creditworthiness. 50 If this investigation reveals "warning
signs" or "red flags," the card-issuer's extension of credit may be
unjustified. 151
Under this level of scrutiny, the court in In re Briese held that
a card-issuer's reliance was not justified. The creditor had issued a
"pre-approved" credit card to a consumer whose debts already
exceeded two-thirds of her income.' 52 Also, the court in In re Feld held
that a creditor could not justifiably rely upon a debtor's
representations when the creditor issued a credit card with a $7700
credit limit to a debtor whose annual income was only $9000 from

147. See note 112 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of pre-approved credit

cards).
148. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 540 (1976).
149. Field, 116 S. Ct. at 444 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 541 cmt. a) (1976).
150. In re Feld, 203 B.R. at 371. Perhaps the best enunciation of the diligence expected of
card-issuers was expressed in In re Alvi:
Passively extending credit hardly constitutes reliance on individual instances of card usage, nor can this Court conceive why such reliance, if it did exist, should always be justifiable. A creditor cannot sit back and do nothing and still meet the standard for actual and
justifiable reliance when it had an opportunity to make an adequate examination or investigation.
In reAlvi, 191 B.R. at 731.
151. In re Briese, 196 B.R. at 454; In re Anastas, 94 F.3d at 1286 (citing In re Eashai, 87
F.3d at 1091). The Ninth Circuit, though, has not focused upon the issuance of credit cards or
the establishment of credit limits to further define this idea. In fact, the Eashai court never even
addressed how the debtor received a $20,000 credit limit when his income upon receiving the
card a couple of years earlier was around $24,000 and he owned 25 other credit cards. Eashai,87
F.3d at 1085.
152. In re Briese, 196 B.R. at 454 ("The plaintiff ignored an obvious risk... "). In Briese, the
debtors received a credit card with a $11,500 credit line while owing $30,000 in unsecured debt
and having a combined income of $46,000. Id. at 444. Furthermore, the debtors had never had a
credit limit above $5000. Id. at 444 n.6.
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disability payments. 153 Both courts observed that their decisions
resembled results similar to the assumption of risk theory, but they
distinguished their holdings by noting that the creditor could not
demonstrate justifiable reliance to that particular debtor due to the
creditor's own ignorance.54
As these cases illustrate, the justifiable reliance standard requires a creditor to issue a credit card carefully and to establish a
responsible credit limit before claiming fraud. This level of reliance
will help resolve current problems associated with the mass distribution of "pre-approved" credit cards. Card-issuers send mass mailings
to preferred customers identified by a multi-factored "credit scoring"
system. For example, issuers look for consumers who already have
credit cards, a good payment record, or a certain income. The credit
scoring systems often quantify the process, essentially removing
judgment. 155 Under such conditions, it is questionable whether a
debtor's representations are even relevant to the card-issuer's decision
to extend credit.156 Therefore, strict scrutiny of an issuer's reliance is
necessary to ensure creditors do not force courts to compensate for the
creditors' own lack of initial inquiry regarding potential debtors.
Besides strictly scrutinizing the issuance of credit cards, an
analysis of initial credit limits set by card-issuers is also appropriate.
First, the computer scoring systems often select consumers who maintain other credit cards. 157 Naturally, enticing a person into receiving
another credit card increases the likelihood of that person taking on

153. In re Feld, 203 B.R. at 372.
154. In re Briese, 196 B.R. at 454 n.17 ("The creditor is not defeated because of the
assumption of a blanket risk ...but because in the particular case the creditor chose to ignore a
known or obvious risk."); In re Feld, 203 B.R. at 370 n.14 ("[D]ischargeability would follow only
because the creditor made no cursory investigation.
").
155. Ritzer, ExpressingAmerica at 139-41 (cited in note 4). See In re Bermingham, 201 B.R.
at 818 (describing credit scoring for pre-approved credit cards); See also In re Akdogan, 204 B.R.
at 97 (questioning the "evidence" of computer printouts that the creditor offered and noting that
without a "meaningful translation or interpretation" they represented "little more than computer
gibberish").
156. In re Briese, 196 B.R. at 454. One may argue that card-issuers are not even establishing actual reliance when issuing "pre-approved" credit cards. See Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 537 cmt. a. (1976) ("Ifthe recipient does not in fact rely on the misrepresentation, the fact that
he takes some action that would be consistent with his reliance and as a result suffers pecuniary
loss, does not impose any liability upon the maker.").. See also In re Alvi, 191 B.R. at 731
(questioning whether actual reliance can exist absent an investigation).
157. It is shocking to observe the number of cases where debtors have accumulated many
credit cards. See, for example, In re Akdogan, 204 B.R. at 92 (debtor owned 18 credit cards with
a total of over $70,000 in debt); In re Eashai,87 F.3d at 1085-86 (debtor owned 26 credit cards
and over $100,000 in debt).
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too much debt. Also, card-issuers have increasingly required less
information from consumers when soliciting "pre-approved" credit
card applications. 158 Additional information could greatly assist cardissuers in establishing responsible credit limits. Failure to obtain
such information should be considered intentional disregard of an
obvious risk. Lastly, the establishment of credit limits is important to
less sophisticated consumers because the limits reflect an experienced
financial opinion as to what that person could afford to charge. 15 9
Thus, when creditors set exorbitant limits, they mislead consumers.
Card-issuers will likely object to this level of scrutiny as second-guessing their decisions to lend. Nevertheless, a successful fraud
claim requires a creditor to establish inducement to extend credit.
Finding a creditor's reliance unjustifiable, or non-existent, does not
prevent issuing "pre-approved" credit cards to consumers, it merely
restricts creditors from claiming fraud as a substitute for their failure
to evaluate potential debtors ex ante. Considering the sophistication
of card-issuers and the resources available to them, this standard is
160
entirely appropriate.
b. MonitoringAccounts and Minimum Payments
'Besides justifying the issuance of a credit card, a creditor must
also establish that it monitored the account to justify the continued
extension of credit.161 The idea of such a duty, while appealing, is
difficult to define. The Ninth Circuit, in In re Anastas, interpreted the
monitoring duty as simply ensuring, before extending credit, that the

158. See Delinquency on Consumer Loans, Federal News Service (cited in note 4) (prepared
testimony of Ricki Helfer, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) ("Credit cardissuers primarily rely on credit bureau reports, which typically provide only payment history and
outstanding credit."). See, for example, In re Bermingham, 201 B.R. at 818 (noting that
"creditors cannot obtain a standard credit bureau report without a debtor's consent" and without
this information cannot ascertain the total credit available to the debtor or the debtor's current
obligations); In re Akdogan, 204 B.R. at 92 (noting that creditor issued the credit card without
requesting debtor's "expenses, assets, nature of employment or business, health, home
ownership, credit references or general financial condition"). See also note 112.
159. See, for example, Singletary and Crenshaw, Sacramento Bee at F1 (cited in note 1)
(describing a debtor's belief that "credit card companies would be approving this credit only if
they thought he could afford the payments").
Additionally, the establishment of responsible credit lines is important to the entire country.
In 1995, available credit lines increased by 30%, creating an "additional potential debt of one
point one trillion dollars." Delinquency on Consumer Loans, Federal News Service (cited in note
4) (testimony of Rep. Leach).
160. See generally Ritzer, ExpressingAmerica at 107-127 (cited in note 4) (describing credit
reporting agencies).
161. Judge Ginsberg's analysis in In re Alvi, set forth in note 150, apparently applies to
monitoring card accounts as well.
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account is not in default. 162 In In re Willis, the bankruptcy court in the
Western District of Missouri used a more detailed inquiry, noting that
an issuer should provide details of any facts available to it at the time
the debtor used its credit card. 163 As the Northern District of New
York Bankruptcy Court observed in In re Parkhurst,though, it would
be unrealistic for courts to require a credit check with each use of a
credit card. 64 Instead, the Parkhurst court examined several facts
provided by the issuer, such as the history of the credit card's use, the
debtor's payments, and the debtor's ability to pay the debt at the time
the card was used. 165
The Parkhurstcourt's consideration of all the evidence ideally
defines the justifiable reliance standard for monitoring a credit card
account without unduly burdening creditors. 66 Admittedly, scrutiny
beyond mere maintenance of minimum payments imposes some
additional burdens on card-issuers, but it also may aid them in proving a debtor's subjective intent for a claim of fraud. A closer relationship between the card-holder and the card-issuer could facilitate
proving the debtor's intent because the issuer may refer to unique
points in a particular account's history rather than comparing it to
amorphous "factors."167 More importantly, the Parkhurst approach
avoids problems encountered by simply looking at the maintenance of
minimum payments to establish justifiable reliance.
The bright line "default" test in Anastas may technically satisfy
the justifiable reliance requirement, but it invites a mechanical
extension of credit and thus contradicts the idea of justifying one's

162. In re Anastas, 94 F.3d 1280, 1286 (9th Cir. 1996). See also In re Samani, 192 B.R. 877,
880 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1996) (finding justifiable reliance on "debtor's prior sporadic payment of at
least the minimum monthly amount due").
163. 190 B.R. 866, 870 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996) ("Any creditor which knew of her financial
condition in February, 1995, would not have been justified in relying on a representation by
debtor that she intended to pay any new credit card debt she was piling up.").
164. 202 B.R. 816, 823 n.10 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996). Besides the increased transaction
time, requesting a credit report with each transaction could detrimentally affect a card-holder's
credit rating. Also, credit reports cost about $1.50 a copy and could increase the cost of credit. Is
Reliance Becoming THE Issue, 4 Consumer Bankr. News (cited in note 11).
165. In re Parkhurst,202 B.R. at 819.
166. If card-issuers obtained credit reports monthly, the cost of credit would increase by an
estimated one percentage point. Is Reliance Becoming THE Issue, 4 Consumer Bankr. News
(cited in note 11). Card-issuers might reduce some of their losses from bankruptcy by obtaining

more credit reports; therefore, this estimation may be overstated. Furthermore, a monthly credit
check may not be necessary, especially when creditors have two months "protection" under
§ 523(a)(2)(C).
167. See, for example, In re Wong, 207 B.R. at 822 (holding credit card debt non-dischargeable when creditor justified reliance on debtor's account history and proved subjective intent).
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reliance. After all, if a debtor is only making minimum payments, the
debt will not be paid off for quite some time. 168 At some point, it
becomes impossible to justify continued extension of credit with the
expectation of repayment. In fact, a recent trend of card-holders filing
for bankruptcy without warning of default has developed.' 69 Also,
while a debtor's payments establish a presumption that indicates a
lack of fraudulent intent, the practice of credit card "kiting"
demonstrates that this requirement can be manipulated and should
0
not be the "end all" inquiry.17
c. Raising Credit Limits
One final situation calling into question the issue of reliance
involves the creditor's increase of a debtor's credit limit. Courts are
split on whether a card-issuer can justify its reliance upon charges
over a credit limit it unilaterally increased.
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit held in
In re Burdge that a card-issuer may unilaterally increase a debtor's
credit limit without investigating and may still claim justifiable
reliance upon a debtor's intent to pay for charges up to the new
limit.'7 ' In Burdge, the debtor received a credit card with a $3000
limit that was subsequently increased to $4000. Three years later, as
part of a promotion, the issuer increased the debtor's credit limit to
$8000.172 Despite finding that the debtor engaged in a spending spree
prior to bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court refused to except any debt
over the original $4000 credit limit because the card-issuer had

168. See note 65. Also, legitimate arguments may be made regarding the reliance on mere
minimum payments. See In re Briese, 196 B.R. at 445 n.6 (noting debtor's argument that a
creditor's reliance upon minimum payments served to "perpetuate the existence of larger

balances subject to inflated interest rates"). This is not to say that minimum payments should
not be used to justify reliance. Indeed, courts have used minimum payments to establish
reasonable reliance. See In re Foley, 156 B.R. at 645 (finding reasonable reliance established by
history of minimum payments). Looking only at minimum payments may be questionable,
however.
169. Michelle Singletary, A New Breed of Debtor Shocks Credit Card-issuers, The
Washington Post F01 (Sept. 18, 1996). Presumably, payments by a debtor indicate an intent to
repay the debt. Therefore, allowing minimum payments to establish reliance may be fair, but
courts should take caution so that creditors do not blindly extend credit. Since more people who
have had a "meaningful credit card relationship for more than seven years" are now filing
bankruptcy, the monitoring of card accounts seems very important to ensure that those
customers do nbt develop a fraudulent intent to incur debt before filing. Id.
170. See In re Eashai, 87 F.3d at 1088-89 (describing credit card kiting and revealing that
making of minimum payments does not always manifest an intent to repay the entire debt).

171. In re Burdge, 198 B.R. 773, 778 (9th Cir. B--P. 1996).
172. The card-issuer claimed that this raise was also due to the debtor's "satisfactory payment history" but provided no evidence of this in court. Id.

19971

COMMON LAW OFFRAUD

1291

increased the debtor's credit limit to $8000 at a time when the debtor
had already exceeded his $4000 credit limit by more than $1500. The
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed in part citing Field v. Mans and
173
declared the entire debt non-dischargeable.
The court in In re McDaniel held differently in a similar situ1
74
ation.
In McDaniel, the debtor received a credit card with a $3000
limit. Under a low interest rate promotional campaign, the cardissuer provided the debtor an "Access Check" to "consolidate other
credit card balances or to buy a holiday gift" and increased the
debtor's credit limit to $5400. This increase came without a credit
check and when the debtor was "financially strapped." The court held
that the creditor's unilateral increase of the debtor's credit limit was a
representation of the creditor, not the debtor, and that the card-issuer
failed to explain its reliance on debt incurred over the original credit
limit.175

The McDaniel decision represents the more sensible approach
for applying the justifiable reliance standard when creditors increase
a debtor's credit line. Automated promotional campaigns to raise
credit limits, in essence, are no different than those generated to issue
credit cards. If card-issuers may freely raise credit limits, they may
circumvent any precautionary measures established for issuing a
credit card. In other words, credit cards may be solicited with responsible credit limits only to have them raised carelessly by issuers. A
requirement of justifiable reliance upon raising credit limits, though,
encourages lower overall credit limits. 176 Furthermore, for debtors
who hold credit cards for a couple of years, issuers should check before
raising limits to ensure that the debtor's financial situation remains
stable 7 7 Finally, requiring debtors to request credit increases pro-

173. Id. at 778-79.
174. 202 B.R. 74 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996).
175. Id. at 79. The court also concluded that to allow the Bank to prevail in this situation
would amount to condoning commercial entrapment. Id. See also In re Chinchilla, 202 B.R. at
1010 (rejecting card-issuer's claim of fraud when debtor exceeded its credit limit of $6500 and
card-issuer responded by raising the debtor's credit limit to $8500).
176. Currently, this country has over $1.2 trillion worth of unused lines of credit.
Delinquency on Consumer Loans, Federal News Service (cited in note 4) (prepared testimony of
Ricki Heifer, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation). This "high level" of unused
credit poses a risk to institutions as consumers become more overextended. Because of such a
high level of unused credit, monitoring should be encouraged when card-issuers decide to raise
credit limits.
177. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook, As We Forgive Our Debtorsat 188 (cited in note 123)
(citing a study of "credit card junkies" that revealed a large number of debtors who had "serious
income interruptions" prior to bankruptcy). Discovery of a change in a debtor's financial
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vides better evidence of fraud, that is a direct representation to the
issuer, should that debtor file bankruptcy thereafter.
2. Are Courts Requiring "Reasonable" Reliance?
Recent credit card cases present a question regarding the
application of the justifiable reliance standard: Do courts really require reasonablereliance of card-issuers? After all, decisions such as
In re Briese and In re Feld resemble In re Ward in which the Sixth
Circuit required a credit card-issuer to perform a credit check to
establish reasonable reliance. 178 Likewise, the reliance required for
monitoring and credit increases seems substantial. While it is unclear
whether courts are requiring issuers to demonstrate "reasonable" reliance, this is not cause for concern.
It is a popular misconception that justifiable reliance presents
a lower threshold than reasonable reliance. 179 Rather, the subjectivity
of the standard demands a high level of justification from sophisticated creditors, like credit card-issuers. In fact, the Supreme Court
stated that the "justifiable" standard may hold such a plaintiff to a
high standard of reliance: "Naifs may recover, at common law and in
bankruptcy, but lots of creditors are not at all naive. The subjectiveness of justifiability cuts both ways.... ."1so

Therefore, credit card

companies should be held to a high level of justification which
essentially forces them to prove "reasonable" reliance at times.' 8 '
Continued concern over this semantic point detracts from the
important fact that, in the credit card context, both standards require
an explanation from a card-issuer as to why the issuer believed a
debtor would pay for the credit extended.

situation would alert card-issuers of possible fraud before it happens or, perhaps, prevent a claim
of fraud based upon an objective look at the account.
178. See Part III.B.2.
179. See, for example, Middleton and Daly, 9 Credit Card Mgt. at 108 (cited in note 11)
(noting that "justifiable reliance is a less exacting standard" and citing attorneys who believe
that justifiable reliance standard is easier for creditors to prove).
180. Field, 116 S. Ct. at 446.
181. This fact applies to non-credit card cases as well. See In re Kirsh, 973 F.2d 1454 (9th
Cir. 1992). In this non-credit card case, the Kirsh court recognized that a lender with knowledge,
experience, and competence should have ordered a title report before relying upon a close friend's
representations about certain real estate. Id. at 1460. The court emphasized the "subjective
effect" on the creditor in the situation that justifiable reliance requires. Id.
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V. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE SUGGESTIONS

A. Universal Adoption of the Common Law of Fraudin
Credit Card Cases
Courts should explicitly reject previous credit card theories and
uniformly adopt the common law of fraud for credit card cases under
the fraud exception. 182 The credit card theories detract from the
essential focus of the fraud exception: the analysis of a debtor's intent
and a creditor's reliance. Addressing both elements equally creates a
balance of interests between the "fresh start" and the fraud exception.
It is essential to pay equal attention to both intent and reliance due to
both the deceptive practices of card-issuers which may obscure a
debtor's intent when using a credit card and to the industry's careless
distribution of credit cards.
Once courts adopt the common law of fraud to analyze credit
card non-dischargeability actions, they should establish justifiable
reliance as a threshold inquiry and dispose of meritless claims more
effectively. Instead of painstakingly establishing that a debtor lacked
the requisite fraudulent intent, courts could decide more credit card
cases on grounds of lack of reliance. Deciding cases on a lack of reliance would send a clear signal to credit card companies that claiming
the fraud exception is not a guaranteed means of obtaining payment.
On the other hand, disposing of cases for failure to establish that a
debtor intended to defraud the card-issuer, without addressing the
issuer's reliance, does not encourage companies to reform their
lending procedures. Although courts may not find reliance dispositive
in many cases, the current practices of the credit card industry
demand that courts first examine whether a creditor justifiably relied
upon the debtor's intent to pay when it extended credit to that debtor.
In re Alvi is an instructive example of the outcome of a fraud
claim when a court properly investigates justifiable reliance. 183 In
Alvi, the debtor filed bankruptcy due to the "economic woes" brought

182. Uniformity is needed on this issue because a general concern of disparity in the bankruptcy system exists. See Delinquency on Consumer Loans, Federal News Service (cited in note
4) (Prepared Testimony of Brady C. Williamson, Chair, National Bankruptcy Review
Commission) ("When the system is subject to so many variable facts, it invites litigation, it
invites injustice through disparate treatment, and it invites abuse."). The problems in
§ 523(a)(2)(A) credit card cases clearly exemplify this concern.
183. In reAlvi, 191 B.R. at 724.
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on by the combination of his gambling habit and being laid off from his
job.184 The creditor alleged fraud because the debtor had exceeded his
$7,500 credit limit prior to filing bankruptcy. The court questioned
the creditor's justifiable reliance and found the evidence of reliance
woefully inadequate. 185 Only after the court examined the creditor's
reliance interest did it support its decision by holding that the creditor
186
had also failed to establish the remaining elements of fraud.
The court's approach in Alvi is appealing because it counters
decisions that suggest that only dishonest debtors take advantage of
the bankruptcy system. 8 7
When card-issuers cannot establish
justifiable reliance, they have essentially acted as accomplices to
allegedly deceptive card-holders, as both parties defraud the public.
Because the issuers are in the best position to correct this behavior,
they should prove their own lack of liability first by establishing
justifiable reliance at the outset.'8 Only after creditors establish their
justifiable reliance can courts determine that the debtor is the party
89
attempting to take advantage of the bankruptcy system.

184. Id. at 727-28.
185. Id. at 729-32.
186. Id. at 731.
187. See, for example, In re Willis, 190 B.R. at 866 (finding debtor to have fraudulent intent
under objective factor test, but issuer denied exception because of lack of reliance); In re Feld,
203 B.R. at 371-72 (finding debtor to have fraudulent intent under subjective test, but denying
exception because of a lack of card-issuer's reliance).
188. See Filipow, 57 Ind.L. J. at 331 (cited in note 3) (describing how credit card-issuers are
in "the best position to devise and initiate safeguards against credit card abuse").
189. In addition to treating reliance as a threshold inquiry, judges should consider using
§ 523(d) more often to impose attorneys' fees against credit card-issuers who bring meritless
fraud claims. As already noted, card-issuers have a considerable amount of leverage and
incentive to bring fraud claims without prior investigation. Awarding attorney fees more often
could supplement the use of the common law of fraud and curtail card-issuers' abuse of the fraud
exception without foreclosing legitimate fraud claims. As the court in In re Chinchillastated:
This Court is not closing the 523(a)(2)(A) 'town gates' to credit card issuers. Just don't
ride into town firing blanks and kicking up dust in the hope of rustling up a settlement.
Come in armed with facts to prove fraud or you may be driven out of town with a 523(d)
bullet in your tail.
202 B.R. at 1018.
Section 523(d) provides that "if a creditor requests a determination of dischargeability of a
consumer debt under subsection (a)(2) of this section, and such debt is discharged, the court shall
grant judgment in favor of the debtor for the costs of, and a reasonable attorney's fees for, the
proceeding if the court finds that the position of the creditor was not substantiallyjustified." 11
U.S.C. § 523(d) (emphasis added). The "substantially justified" language, which reduced the
likelihood of awarding a debtor attorney fees, was added to this provision in 1984, the same time
the "load up" provision was added to § 523(a)(2)(C). Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 354 (1984). Both provisions favor credit cardissuers. If the courts recognized the unjustified fraud claims more often, though, perhaps more
careful lending and litigation would ensue.
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B. Rejection of the Objective Intent Proposal
In light of the preceding analysis, the consumer credit industry's proposal to codify an objective intent requirement for section
523(a)(2)(A) is ill-founded. Courts are already beginning to draw upon
the common law of fraud to analyze a debtor's intent under a
subjective standard.'90 The subjective intent standard, in conjunction
with the justifiable reliance requirement, deters credit card companies
from using the fraud exception as a collection device in lieu of taking
precautions regarding the maintenance of credit card accounts.
Codifying an objective intent standard, on the other hand, exposes the
fraud exception to abuse by credit card-issuers. Also, an objective
standard is not likely to alter a debtors' behavior because probably few
debtors are aware of the existence of this Bankruptcy Code provision.
Most importantly, the irony behind the credit card industry's
proposal of an objective intent standard reveals the proposal's shortcomings. If a card-issuer can establish that a debtor incurred certain
debt without the reasonable ability to repay, that creditor would
struggle to explain how it extended credit with the justifiable
expectation of getting repaid. Apparently, though, the credit card
industry is attempting to change the Bankruptcy Code instead of the
individual policies and practices of card-issuers. 191

190. See, for example, In re Briese, 196 B.R. at 440; In re Murphy, 190 B.R. at 327.
191. If the fraud exception of the Bankruptcy Code should be amended at all, § 523(a)(2)(A)
should explicitly require a "reasonable" reliance standard for credit card-issuers. While the
justifiable reliance standard adequately addresses many reliance concerns relating to credit cardissuers, ample room exists for confusion in its application. Credit card-issuers may not understand that in certain circumstances they are essentially required to demonstrate reasonable
reliance on a debtor's representations. Codifying a reasonable reliance standard, however, would
serve notice of this fact to credit card-issuers. Furthermore, an explicit "reasonable" reliance
standard may encourage more diligent investigation of fraud claims and help curb the careless
distribution of credit cards.
Interestingly enough, the Supreme Court, in holding that § 523(a)(2)(A) required justifiable
reliance, questioned why a different rule of "reasonable" reliance applies when "fraud is carried
to the point of a written statement" Field, 116 S. Ct. at 437. As indicated by the legislative
history, Congress inserted the "reasonable" reliance requirement in § 523(a)(2)(B) out of concern
for certain creditor manipulation of debtors. More specifically, Congress noted that consumer
finance companies sometimes encourage falsity in writing so that they could insulate their own
debts from discharge.
Congress's concern reflects the behavior of today's credit card-issuers who encourage debtspending and then cry "fraud" when card-holders file bankruptcy. Therefore, perhaps it is time
to amend the Code with a "reasonable" reliance requirement for card-issuers. Of course, to
ensure proper attention to any codification of such a reliance standard, courts must first dismiss
previous "credit card theories" and begin applying the common law of fraud to § 523(a)(2)(A)
credit card cases.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Courts need to adopt the common law of fraud to resolve
problems resulting from the application of the credit card theories to
section 523(a)(2)(A) claims. Applying the common law of fraud
correctly identifies the parties responsible for society's credit card
problems as both consumers and credit card companies by focusing
upon the elements of intent and reliance in section 523(a)(2)(A)
claims. By requiring issuers to prove a debtor's subjective fraudulent
intent, the fraud exception, as applied to credit card debt, will focus on
denying discharge to dishonest debtors without opening the door for
debtors to commit fraud. More importantly, the common law of fraud
requires issuers to show justifiable reliance, and therefore addresses
previously neglected reliance problems created by current credit
industry practices.
Overall, the common law of fraud ensures that fraud claims
under section 523(a)(2)(A) are not abused by frustrated creditors that
unwisely extended credit to a debtor. The application of the common
law of fraud to section 523(a)(2)(A) credit card cases preserves the
inherent balance of interests between the fraud exception and the
"fresh start" policy by ensuring that only innocent creditors receive
exceptions for the debts of dishonest debtors.
CraigA. Bruens*
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